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I. INTRODUCTIOND URING this Survey period, Texas courts addressed various is-
sues related to insurance law, including the application and
scope of the "eight-corners" rule in determining the duty to de-
fend, the availability of extracontractual remedies in the workers' com-
pensation context, and the right of an insured to choose independent
counsel in light of a conflict of interest. Additionally, the Fifth Circuit
certified two questions to the Texas Supreme Court regarding the appli-
cation of the "contractual liability" exclusion in a commercial general lia-
bility policy. Finally, both state and federal courts continued to struggle
with the relative rights of co-insurers through contribution and subroga-
tion, as this area of law continued to evolve during this Survey period.
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II. WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE
A. EXTRACONTRACTUAL REMEDIES IN WORKERS'
COMPENSATION CASES
In 1988, the Texas Supreme Court extended the common law duty of
good faith and fair dealing to workers' compensation insurers.' During
this Survey period, however, the Texas Supreme Court overruled its prior
decision and held that when the Texas legislature substantially amended
the Workers' Compensation Act in 1989, the legislature sufficiently ad-
dressed the deficiencies that led the Texas Supreme Court to create the
common law remedy.2 In Texas Mutual Insurance Company v. Ruttiger,
the Texas Supreme Court found that because the legislature created de-
tailed procedures and remedies in the amended Workers' Compensation
Act (the Act), there was no longer any need for a judicially imposed
cause of action. 3 Rather, the Act now provides the exclusive remedy in all
workers' compensation claims and the sole recourse to challenge most
insurer misconduct.4 Therefore, the supreme court ruled that an injured
employee may not sue a workers' compensation carrier for common-law
bad faith or for unfair settlement and investigation practices under the
Texas Insurance Code.5
A practical understanding of the implications of Ruttiger requires ex-
amination of two preceding landmark decisions. Specifically, in Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co. v. Marshall, the Texas Supreme Court held that the
exclusive-remedy nature of the workers' compensation system did not bar
claims under the former Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Act-Article
21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code. 6 Similarly, in Aranda v. Insurance Co.
of North America, the Texas Supreme Court held that a workers' com-
pensation insurer may be liable for breach of the common law duty of
good faith and fair dealing.7 These decisions were based largely on per-
ceived procedural flaws in the workers' compensation scheme, which cre-
ated an unequal balance of power between insurers and employees.8
However, after more than twenty years of litigation and statutory amend-
ments, the Texas Supreme Court was given the opportunity to reexamine
the utility of these statutory and common law causes of action.
The factual background of Ruttiger provided the Texas Supreme Court
with an interesting vehicle in which to make workers' compensation re-
1. Aranda v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 748 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Tex. 1988), overruled by Tex.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ruttiger, 381 S.W.3d 430 (Tex. 2012).
2. Ruttiger, 381 S.W.3d at 449.
3. Id. at 444-45.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 455-56.
6. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Marshall, 724 S.W.2d 770, 771-72 (Tex. 1987), overruled
by Ruttiger, 381 S.W.3d 430.
7. Aranda v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 748 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Tex. 1988), overruled by Rut-
tiger, 381 S.W.3d at 430.
8. See id. at 212-13; see also Marshall, 724 S.W.2d at 772.
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forms. 9 Timothy Ruttiger (Ruttiger) allegedly sustained bilateral hernias
while carrying a pipe at work. Ruttiger's workers' compensation carrier
began paying temporary income benefits. During the initial investigation,
however, some of Ruttiger's co-workers told the claims handler that Rut-
tiger was injured while playing softball. Based on this information, the
insurer denied Ruttiger's claim for hernia surgery. Ruttiger and the car-
rier then went through a benefit review conference with the Texas Work-
ers' Compensation Commission in an attempt to resolve the dispute. The
carrier agreed to pay for the surgery and other medical expenses, and
reinstated the weekly benefits. Six months later, while Ruttiger was still
receiving benefits, he sued the carrier, alleging bad faith, unfair settle-
ment and investigation practices under the Texas Insurance Code and vi-
olations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection
Act (the DTPA).
The case proceeded to trial where a jury found for Ruttiger on all of his
claims.10 The
Houston First District Court of Appeals affirmed." The Texas Su-
preme Court granted the carrier's petition for review and held that the
comprehensive Act barred Ruttiger from pursuing his claim for unfair
settlement and investigation practices under the Texas Insurance Code.12
The supreme court also dismissed Ruttiger's DTPA claim, as it was de-
pendent upon his claim for violation of the Texas Insurance Code.13 Ulti-
mately, the supreme court was unable to reach a resolution on the bad
faith claim, which had its genesis in Aranda; therefore, the supreme court
remanded the issue to the court of appeals, which had not considered the
issue.14 In October 2011, both sides filed motions asking the supreme
court to rehear the case, and the supreme court granted the motions and
withdrew its previous decision.' 5 In a 5-4 split decision, the majority ex-
pressly overruled Aranda.16
The supreme court began by exploring the pre-1989 workers' compen-
sation scheme that gave rise to the Aranda decision, where injured work-
ers then had very little bargaining power and protections from carriers
due to the deficient administrative process for remedying arbitrary claim
denials.' 7 In the supreme court's view, the pre-1989 scheme allowed carri-
ers to refuse to pay benefits while the review was ongoing, thus creating
an incentive for delay.' 8 Moreover, the review process failed to effect fair
resolutions and acted as a "conveyor belt" to litigation because the par-
9. See Ruttiger, 381 S.W.3d at 433-36.
10. Id. at 435.
11. Id.
12. Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ruttiger, No. 08-0751, 2011 Tex. LEXIS 600, at *37, *39-40
(Tex. Aug. 26, 2011).
13. Id. at *42.
14. Id. at *2-3.
15. Ruttiger, 381 S.W.3d at 432.
16. Id. at 433.
17. Id. at 449-50.
18. Id. at 447.
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ties rarely put forth evidence and witnesses.19 One year after Aranda was
decided, however, the Texas legislature overhauled the entire workers'
compensation scheme by adding more significant proceedings and reme-
dies for injured workers. 20 The supreme court emphasized that significant
and timely procedures that subjected carriers to substantial penalties for
exercising undue delay were subsequently put in place.21 Therefore, al-
lowing common law bad faith claims to proceed in the workers' compen-
sation context would "frustrate[] the Legislature's intent to have disputes
resolved quickly and objectively." 2 2
Given these reforms, the supreme court concluded that providing
workers with § 541 claims would incentivize delay, as the new dispute
resolution process would often be disrupted by these claims (as was the
case in Ruttiger).23 Consequently, the supreme court held that the new
provisions of the Act established exclusive remedies for injured workers,
rendering §§ 541.060 (unfair claim settlement practices) and 542.003 (fail-
ure to investigate and pay claims promptly) superfluous in the workers'
compensation context.24 The supreme court, however, did not extend its
holding to § 541.061 regarding misrepresentation of policy provisions, as
that section did not specify that it applied in the context of settling
claims. 25
In conclusion, the supreme court held in Ruttiger that the Act now pro-
vides detailed procedures and remedies for injured workers, and so there
is no longer any need for extra-contractual liability in the workers' com-
pensation context.26 Rather, the Act now provides the injured worker
with an exclusive remedy and the sole recourse to challenge most insurer
misconduct. As such, Ruttiger undoubtedly changes the landscape of
workers' compensation law in Texas and bad faith litigation in general.
III. INSURED'S RIGHT TO INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
In general, liability insurance policies obligate the insurer to both in-
demnify the insured for settlements or judgments and provide coverage
for the insured's defense expenses. Therefore, pursuant to these policies,
the insurer must pay for fees incurred by the insured's defense counsel.
This "duty to defend" typically allows the insurer to select defense coun-
sel of its own choosing.27 However, this right is not absolute, as Texas law
has traditionally allowed the insured to select independent counsel under
certain circumstances-specifically, where the insurer issues a reservation
19. See id. at 441.
20. See id. at 440.
21. Id. at 442-43.
22. Id. at 450-51.
23. Id. at 451.
24. Id. at 444-45.
25. Id. at 446.
26. Id. at 451.
27. See Downhole Navigator, L.L.C. v. Nautilus Ins. Co., 686 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir.
2012) (citing N. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davalos, 140 S.W.3d 685, 688 (Tex. 2004)).
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of rights letter and a conflict of interest arises because "the facts to be
adjudicated in the liability lawsuit are the same facts upon which cover-
age depends." 28
In Downhole Navigator, L.L.C. v. Nautilus Insurance Co., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered whether a liabil-
ity insurer's reservation of rights letter created a conflict of interest,
thereby shifting the right to select defense counsel to the insured.29 The
Texas Supreme Court in Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee v.
American Home Assurance Co. had "observed that 'the most common
conflict between an insurer and [its] insured' is whether a claim falls
within [coverage]," and "coverage issues may . . . depend on facts devel-
oped in the litigation."30 In rejecting an expansive reading of Texas law
regarding the right to select independent counsel, the Fifth Circuit held
that the mere issuance of a reservation of rights letter does not entitle an
insured to select its own independent counsel at its insurer's expense.3 1
In Downhole, an oil well operator hired Downhole to help redirect a
well toward a desired reservoir. The operator later brought suit against
Downhole, alleging that Downhole negligently executed the redirect
plan. Downhole then tendered the suit to its liability insurer, Nautilus,
which offered to defend Downhole subject to a reservation of rights.
However, Downhole rejected Nautilus's conditional defense, claiming
that the offer to defend under a reservation of rights "created a material
conflict with respect to the selection of counsel." 32 Nautilus responded by
stating that it had reserved rights and would continue investigating the
matter, and unless a coverage issue arose, Nautilus would not pay for
independent counsel.
Downhole then filed a declaratory judgment action against Nautilus in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, seek-
ing a declaration that Nautilus was obligated to reimburse Downhole for
its defense costs. 3 3 The magistrate judge held that Nautilus had no duty to
reimburse Downhole for its independent counsel's fees.34 Downhole ap-
pealed, arguing that Unauthorized Practice stood for the proposition that
a conflict of interest arises any time facts that could be developed in the
underlying suit are the same facts upon which coverage depends.3 5 More
specifically, Downhole argued that where an insurer defends its insured
under a reservation of rights, counsel appointed by the insurer may be
inclined to develop facts in the underlying litigation that could reinforce
defenses to coverage.36
28. Id. (quoting Davalos, 140 S.W.3d at 689) (internal quotation marks omitted).
29. Id. at 326-27.
30. Id. at 329 (quoting Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Am. Home Assurance
Co., 261 S.W.3d 24, 40 (Tex. 2008)).
31. Id. at 330.
32. Id. at 327.
33. Id. at 327-28.
34. Id. at 328.
35. Id. at 329.
36. Id. at 329-30.
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Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit rejected Downhole's "strained reading of
. . . [an] inconsequential line of dicta" from Unauthorized Practice as "an
illogical leap," holding that no conflict was created by Nautilus's offer to
defend under a reservation of rights.37 The Fifth Circuit found that the
facts to be adjudicated in the underlying suit were not the same "facts
upon which coverage depends."38 Rather, the underlying suit concerned
only whether Downhole negligently performed its work.39 The policy did
not exclude coverage for Downhole's negligence and Nautilus did not re-
serve its right to deny coverage based on Downhole's negligence. 40 Ac-
cordingly, "'the facts to be adjudicated' in the underlying [suit were] not
[equivalent to the] 'facts upon which coverage depends,"' and therefore
no conflict of interest existed. 41 Based on this, the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the magistrate judge's ruling.42
Since the Texas Supreme Court issued its opinion in Davalos in 2004,
confusion had existed as to whether the mere issuance of a reservation of
rights letter precluded an insurer from controlling the insured's defense.
In Downhole Navigator, however, the Fifth Circuit took a practical and
equitable approach by requiring that an actual conflict exist between the
interests of the insurer and those of the insured. 43 Policies imposing a
duty to defend on an insurer generally confer a corresponding right upon
the insurer to control the insured's defense. Accordingly, had the Fifth
Circuit adopted Downhole's position, insurers seeking to discharge their
contractual obligations to defend their insureds, while also preserving
their own contractual rights under their policies by issuing reservation of
rights letters, would have been deprived of a substantial contractual right
under the insurance contract. The Fifth Circuit avoided such a harsh and
arbitrary result by prudently limiting the scope of the insured's right to
independent counsel to only those situations where liability and coverage
issues so overlap that the outcome of the underlying suit practically re-
solves the coverage issues.44
IV. COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE
For the past several decades, courts have struggled with how to apply
the terms of a Commercial General Liability (CGL) policy to construc-
tion defect claims involving issues of contractual liability. For example, in
Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co., the Texas Supreme
Court found that because the language of CGL policies does not distin-
guish between tort and contract damages, "any preconceived notion that
a CGL policy is only for tort liability must yield to the policy's actual
37. Id. at 330.
38. Id. at 331.
39. Id. at 329.
40. Id.
41. Id. (quoting N. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davalos, 140 S.W.3d 685, 689 (Tex. 2004)).




language." 45 Several years later, the Texas Supreme Court concluded that
contractual liability was excluded by the standard CGL policy. 4 6
In Gilbert Texas Construction, L.P. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London,
the Texas Supreme Court held that the "contractual liability" exclusion
applies to exclude coverage for claims where the insured assumes liability
in a contract, unless an exception to the exclusion is implicated.47 Al-
though the carrier conceded that the claims in the underlying suit fell
within the broad, general terms of the policy, it argued that because the
insured's only basis for liability was Gilbert's contractual obligations as-
sumed under contract, the contractual liability exclusion applied to bar
coverage. 48 The insured countered that a narrow reading should be given
to the exclusion and that "assumption" in the exclusion's terms referred
only to the assumption of "liability of another such as in hold-harmless or
indemnity agreements." 49 The insured further argued that, at the very
least, the exclusion was ambiguous and should therefore be interpreted in
favor of coverage.50 To the extent the exclusion actually applied, the in-
sured took the position that its liability to the underlying plaintiff fell
within the exclusion's exception for liability for damages that the insured
would bear even in the absence of the contract or agreement.51
Ultimately, the supreme court rejected the insured's arguments in Gil-
bert, noting that the insured "agreed under its contract with DART to
'repair any damage to . . . facilities, including those that are the property
of a third party, resulting from failure to comply with the requirements of
this contract or failure to exercise reasonable care in performing the
work." 52 Because the insured had defeated all potential tort liability
through summary judgment, the only remaining theory of liability arose
from "an obligation or liability contractually assumed by [the insured]."53
Furthermore, the supreme court found the language of the exclusion to
be plain and unambiguous, and had the parties intended the narrow ex-
clusion for which the insured advocated, the parties easily could have
drafted a more narrow exclusion. 54
In Ewing Construction Co. v. Amerisure Insurance Co., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit interpreted Gilbert as
45. Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 242 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tex. 2007).
46. Gilbert Tex. Constr., L.P. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 327 S.W.3d 118, 126
(Tex. 2010).
47. Id. at 131-32. The "contractual liability" exclusion in standard commercial general
liability policies states: "[This] insurance does not apply to 'bodily injury' or 'property dam-
age' for which the insured is obligated to pay damages by reason of the assumption of
liability in a contract or agreement. This exclusion does not apply to liability for damages:
(1) [a]ssumed in a contract or agreement that is an 'insured contract;' or (2) [t]hat the
insured would have in the absence of the contract or agreement." See id at 124.
48. Id. at 125.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 133.
52. Id. at 126.
53. Id. at 127.
54. Id.
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"stand[ing] for the proposition that [the] contractual liability exclusion"
applies when an insured has entered into a contract, and by doing so has
assumed liability for its own performance under that contract.55 There-
fore, according to the Fifth Circuit, the exclusion barred coverage for the
faulty workmanship alleged in the underlying Suit. 5 6 However, less than
two months after issuing its opinion, the Fifth Circuit withdrew Ewing
and certified the following two questions to the Texas Supreme Court:
1. Does a general contractor that enters into a contract in which it
agrees to perform its construction work in a good and workmanlike
manner, without more specific provisions enlarging this obligation,
"assume liability" for damages arising out of the contractor's defec-
tive work so as to trigger the Contractual Liability Exclusion.
2. If the answer to question one is "Yes" and the contractual lia-
bility exclusion is triggered, do the allegations in the underlying law-
suit alleging that the contractor violated its common law duty to
perform the contract in a careful, workmanlike, and non-negligent
manner fall within the exception to the contractual liability exclusion
for "liability that would exist in the absence of contract."57
In Ewing, the insured contracted to construct tennis courts for the
Tuloso-Midway Independent School District in Corpus Christi, Texas
(the District).58 Shortly after the construction was completed, the District
complained that the tennis courts were flaking and cracking. The District
then brought suit against the insured seeking damages for the alleged de-
fective construction. In its petition, the District alleged that the insured
failed to: (1) properly prepare for and manage construction, (2) retain
and oversee subcontractors, (3) perform in a good and workmanlike man-
ner, and (4) complete construction in accordance with the contract terms
and specifications. In addition, the petition alleged that the insured
"breached [its] duty to Plaintiff to use ordinary care in the performance
of [its] contract[ ], proximately causing damages to Plaintiff."5 9 The in-
sured then tendered defense of the suit to its insurer; however, the in-
surer denied that it owed a duty to defend. Both parties then filed
declaratory judgment actions to determine their rights and duties under
the policy. Ultimately, the district court applied Gilbert and found that
the District's petition alleged contractual liability; therefore, the contrac-
tual liability exclusion applied to bar coverage. 60
On appeal, the insured argued that pursuant to Gilbert, a distinction
should be made between entering into a construction contract and assum-
55. Ewing Constr. Co., Inc. v. Amerisure Ins. Co., 684 F.3d 512, 519 (5th Cir. 2012),
opinion withdrawn and superseded by Ewing Constr. Co., Inc. v. Amerisure Ins. Co., 690
F.3d 628 (5th Cir. 2012).
56. Id.
57. Ewing Constr. Co., Inc., 690 F.3d at 633.
58. Ewing Constr. Co., Inc., 684 F.3d at 516.
59. Id. at 517.
60. Id. at 518.
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ing liability for faulty workmanship under the contract. 61 In other words,
the insured characterized the promise to repair third-party property in
Gilbert as an "assumption of liability," while the "implied promise .. . to
perform the contract with ordinary care" here was not.62 More specifi-
cally, the insured cited dicta from Gilbert that the contractual liability
exclusion does not "'preclude[ ] liability for all breach of contract
claims.'"63 However, the Fifth Circuit found that the insured's argument
"elevates ambiguous dicta from Gilbert while minimizing that opinion's
clear holding."64 In the eyes of the majority, "Gilbert, principally, stands
for the proposition that a CGL policy's contractual liability exclusion ex-
cludes coverage for property damage when 'the insured assumes liability
for . .. property damage by means of contract." 65 Because the District's
petition demonstrated that the insured assumed liability for defective
construction by executing a contract to complete the project, whether the
breached promise was express or implied was insignificant as the promise
was "contractual [in] nature." 66 Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit character-
ized the Texas Supreme Court's approach to the exclusion in Gilbert as
being "straightforward: Apply the plain language of the exclusion, rather
than grafting additional language to it."67 According to the Fifth Circuit,
this "plain meaning approach" conforms to the traditional "principle that
a CGL policy is not protection for the insured's poor performance of a
contract."6
After determining that the contractual liability exclusion applied, the
Fifth Circuit next examined whether any exception to the exclusion re-
stored coverage.69 Here, the insured argued that the exception "for liabil-
ity that 'the insured would have in the absence of the contract or
agreement"' applied. 70 Because the petition in the underlying suit used
the word "negligence," and liability for negligence "exists irrespective of
a contract," the insured believed the district court erred in finding that
the exception did not apply.71 The Fifth Circuit, however, found that use
of the term "negligence" was not dispositive, as courts must evaluate the
substance of the underlying petition to "determine whether it alleges an
action in contract, tort, or both." 72 This is accomplished by looking to the
basis of liability and the nature of the alleged loss; therefore, "'[wlhen the
only loss or damage is to the subject matter of the contract, the plaintiff's
61. Id.
62. Id. at 518-19.
63. Id. at 519. (quoting Gilbert Tex. Constr., L.P. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London,










72. Id. at 520.
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action is ordinarily on the contract." 73 Because the insured's duty to con-
struct the bargained-for tennis courts arose out of its contract with the
District, the contract was the source of the insured's liability.7 4 Moreover,
the damages alleged were "to the subject matter of the contract, the ten-
nis courts, not to any other property."75 Consequently, the exception to
the exclusion did not apply, and the insurer owed no duty to defend.76
In withdrawing its original ruling and certifying the above questions to
the Texas Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit retreated from its original po-
sition by first recognizing that the correct application of Lamar Homes,
Inc. v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co. 77 and Gilbert78 is unclear and presents
a disputed and important question of Texas law.79 The Fifth Circuit fur-
ther noted that it was unclear which interpretation would better advance
"the goals of Texas insurance law and [would be] more compatible with
the structure of the CGL [policy]." 80 The Fifth Circuit's original ruling
undoubtedly conferred a broad reading upon the contractual liability ex-
clusion, which some viewed as barring CGL coverage for virtually all
faulty workmanship cases arising from construction contracts. Conse-
quently, the stakes are high for those in the construction and insurance
businesses as we wait for the supreme court's answers to the certified
questions.
V. THE EIGHT-CORNERS RULE
During the Survey period, several cases addressed the application of
the eight-corners (or "complaint-allegation") rule in determining an in-
surer's duty to defend. Based on these cases, it seems clear that, for the
time being, Texas state and federal courts will strictly adhere to the eight-
corners rule and will only deviate from the rule under limited
circumstances.
A. GENERAL RULE AND INTERPRETATION
In GuideOne Specialty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Missionary Church of
Disciples of Jesus Christ, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit addressed several aspects of duty to defend jurisprudence in
Texas, including whether application of the eight-corners rule is linked to
any specific policy language.81
73. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. DeLanney, 809 S.W.2d 493,




77. Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 242 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2007).
78. Gilbert Tex. Constr., L.P. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 327 S.W.3d 118 (Tex.
2010).
79. Ewing Constr. Co., Inc. v. Amerisure Ins. Co., 690 F.3d 628, 632 (5th Cir. 2012).
80. Id.
81. GuideOne Specialty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Missionary Church of Disciples of Jesus
Christ, 687 F.3d 676, 678-81 (5th Cir. 2012).
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In March 2006, two members of the Missionary Church of the Disciples
of Jesus Christ (the Church) were involved in an automobile accident
while driving a vehicle owned by another member of the Church.82 A
group of the Church's members had originally driven from Dallas to San
Antonio to visit one of the Church's fathers, but upon arrival at the
Church's prayer center, the group decided that the center was dirty and
needed to be cleaned. The vehicle owner, however, had to leave San
Antonio. While the owner was gone, the remaining members drove the
vehicle to lunch and were involved in the subject accident. Thereafter, the
driver of the other vehicle filed suit against the Church, the driver, and
the vehicle's owner, alleging that the Church and owner negligently en-
trusted the vehicle to the driver. GuideOne provided automobile insur-
ance to the Church, with coverage for both owned and "nonowned
'autos." 83 By amendment, the policy defined nonowned autos as "those
autos [the Church does] not own, lease, hire, rent or borrow that are used
in connection with [the Church's] business. This includes 'autos' owned
by [the Church's] employees or partners or members of their households
but only while used in [the Church's] business or [the Church's] personal
affairs." 84
In January 2011, GuideOne initiated a declaratory judgment action in
the District Court for the Northern District of Texas, seeking a declara-
tion of no duty to defend or indemnify in the underlying suit. In Guide-
One's motion for summary judgment, default was entered against the
driver.85 The Church and the vehicle owner argued that factual issues
precluded a determination of the duty to defend and indemnify while the
underlying plaintiff argued that the allegations in its complaint triggered
both duties under the policy. 86 Ultimately, the district court ruled in
GuideOne's favor, holding that because the policy language created co-
extensive defense and indemnity obligations, the eight-corners rule did
not apply and extrinsic evidence related to liability in the underlying suit
could therefore be considered. 7 More specifically, the district court
found that when the eight-corners rule originally developed, the standard
CGL form contained language obligating the insurer to defend regardless
of whether the allegations were "groundless, false or fraudulent."88 Since
1986, however, subsequent forms have deleted this particular language. 89
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit began by considering the propriety of the
82. Id. at 679.
83. Id. at 680.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 681.
86. Id. at 680.
87. Id. at 681.
88. Id. at 683 n.5.
89. See David S. White, Federal District Judge Says Texas' "Eight-Corner Rule" Is No
Longer Law. Really?, LAw & INs. (June 25, 2010), http://lawandinsurance.typepad.com/law
_and-insurance/2010/06/federal-district-judge-says-texas-eightcorner-rule-is-no-longer-law-
really.html (citing International Risk Management Institute, Annotated Commercial Gen-
eral Liability Insurance, p. v.c.12 (15th ed. 2008)).
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district court's ruling on GuideOne's defense obligation. 90 Here, the Fifth
Circuit noted that "Texas courts and federal courts have consistently ap-
plied the eight-corners rule," whereby the insurer's defense obligations
are determined solely "'by the allegations in the pleadings and the lan-
guage of the .. . policy."91 The district court, however, did not follow this
"well-established approach," as it reasoned that the parties contracted
around the eight-corners rule by employing the language "we have no
duty to defend suits for 'bodily injury' or 'property damage' not covered
by this endorsement." 92 The Fifth Circuit disagreed, explaining that "[t]he
eight-corners rule is a judge-made rule," and while the Fifth Circuit had
previously held that parties could contract around the rule,93 the parties
had not provided any "cases in which a Texas court or a federal court
interpreting Texas law did not apply the eight-corners rule when ascer-
taining the scope of a duty to defend." 9 4 Furthermore, GuideOne was
unable to persuade the court to do S0 .95
Here, the Fifth Circuit disagreed with GuideOne's reasoning that by
defining the duties to defend and indemnify in the same terms, the duty
to defend was no longer broader than the duty to indemnify.96 Rather
than finding that the distinction between the two duties is based on spe-
cific policy language, the Fifth Circuit explained that "[t]he contrast in-
stead results from what the language setting forth those duties is
compared with: While courts compare the language setting forth the duty
to defend with the allegations in the petition, they compare the language
setting forth the duty to indemnify with the evidence presented by the
parties." 97 Moreover, the Fifth Circuit found that the mere fact that the
same policy language sets forth both the duty to defend and the duty to
indemnify does not require the court to examine extrinsic evidence in
ascertaining defense obligations.98 Therefore, the policy "language [gave]
no reason to depart from Texas's time-honored manner of interpreting
insurers' duty to defend." 99
As discussed below, the Texas Supreme Court has not yet expressly
recognized any exception to the eight-corners rule, instead maintaining
strict adherence to the rule. The Fifth Circuit, however, has shown more
90. GuideOne Specialty Mut. Ins. Co., 687 F.3d at 682.
91. Id. at 682-83 (quoting Nat'l Cas. Co. v. W. World Ins. Co., 669 F.3d 608, 612 (5th
Cir. 2012)).
92. Id. at 683-84.
93. Id. at 683 (citing Pendergest-Holt v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London,
600 F.3d 562, 574 (5th Cir. 2010); 14 Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, COUCH ON INS.
§ 200:5 (3d ed. 2009)).
94. Id. By footnote, the Fifth Circuit also explained that it had uncovered no Texas
cases making application of the "eight-corners" rule contingent "on policy language pro-
viding that the duty to defend applies to 'groundless, false or fraudulent' allegations." Id. at
683 n.5.
95. Id. at 683.
96. Id. at 684.
97. Id. (citing Utica Nat. Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Am. Indem. Co., 141 S.W.3d 198, 201, 203
(Tex. 2004)); Northfield Ins. Co. v. Loving Home Care, 363 F.3d 523, 531 (5th Cir. 2004)).
98. Id. at 686.
99. Id. at 684.
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willingness to deviate from the rule, expressly applying a narrow excep-
tion under limited circumstances when determining the duty to defend.100
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit in GuideOne refused to hold that the dele-
tion of the "groundless, false or fraudulent" language from the 1986 pol-
icy form amendments changed the rule.101 Therefore, it appears that
absent the limited criteria set forth in Northfield Insurance Co. v. Loving
Home Care, Inc., the Fifth Circuit will strictly adhere to the eight-corners
rule.
B. THE POLICY PERIOD REQUIREMENT
In GEICO General Insurance Co. v. Austin Power Inc., the Houston
Fourteenth District Court of Appeals examined whether an insured was
entitled to a defense by its insurer against a personal injury lawsuit, de-
spite the fact that the underlying complaint did not name a specific date
of injury.102 Ultimately, the appellate court rejected the insurer's argu-
ment that the underlying plaintiffs must affirmatively and expressly allege
an injury occurring within the policy period in order to trigger the duty to
defend.103 Rather, because the complaint was written in the past tense,
the plaintiffs' injuries potentially occurred during the policy period; ac-
cordingly, the insurer's duty to defend was triggered.104
In the underlying suit, the plaintiffs sued several defendants (including
Austin Power), alleging injuries due to exposure to the defendants' asbes-
tos-containing machinery and products.105 In their complaint, the plain-
tiffs did not identify the date that the alleged injuries occurred. Austin
Power was ultimately dismissed as a party to the underlying suit,106 but it
sought coverage from GEICO for costs incurred in defending the suit.
The trial court granted Austin Power's motion for summary judgment on
its coverage claim and ordered GEICO to pay Austin Power's defense
costs.' 07 GEICO then appealed, arguing that because the underlying "pe-
tition lacked a specific temporal factual allegation it was not a potentially
covered claim under the insurance policy and thus did not trigger GE-
ICO's duty to defend." 08
The appellate court began its analysis by recognizing that "[a]n insurer
has a duty to defend when a third party sues the insured on allegations
that, if taken as true, potentially state a cause of action within the cover-
100. See, e.g., Northfield Ins. Co., 363 F.3d at 529-35; Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Graham,
473 F.3d 596, 602-04 (5th Cir. 2006).
101. See GuideOne Specialty Mut. Ins. Co., 687 F.3d at 684-86.
102. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. v. Austin Power Inc., 357 S.W.3d 821, 822-23 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied).
103. Id. at 824-26.
104. Id. at 825-26.






age terms of the policy."109 "Even [where these] allegations are ground-
less, false, or fraudulent, the insurer [must] defend."110 The appellate
court further explained that when analyzing the duty to defend question,
a Texas court must employ the eight-corners or "complaint-allegation
rule: 'an insurer's duty to defend is determined by the third-party plain-
tiff's pleadings, considered in light of the policy provisions, without re-
gard to the truth or falsity of those allegations.""' When applying this
rule, the pleadings' allegations must be construed liberally,112 and all
doubts regarding the duty to defend must be resolved in the insured's
favor.113 Moreover, the rule does not require the court "to ignore those
inferences logically flowing from the facts alleged in the petition."114
Despite the fact that the underlying petition contained no allegations
regarding the date of injury, the appellate court found "other indications
of the time of injury."" 5 Specifically, the petition alleged that one of the
plaintiffs was exposed to asbestos on numerous occasions and that each
additional exposure caused or contributed to his injuries, which included
asbestos-related lung disease. The plaintiffs also brought a claim for con-
spiracy, alleging that the conspiracy took place over several decades. In
its argument, GEICO attempted to distinguish Gehan Homes Ltd. v. Em-
ployers Mutual Casualty Co., which held that bodily injury or property
damage alleged to have happened in the "past" potentially fell within the
policy's coverage period.116 Here, GEICO argued that because the un-
derlying petition in the present case lacked the signifier "past," the court
could not take the "logical step" to conclude that the plaintiffs' injuries
occurred in "a prior window of time."" 7 The appellate court, however,
disagreed, explaining that the petition was written in the past tense, the
alleged conspiracy took place over several decades, and asbestos-related
diseases generally occur over long periods of time." 8 In keeping with the
general rules that pleadings must be construed liberally and doubts must
be resolved in the insured's favor, the appellate court held that the peti-
tion alleged a "potential occurrence within the policy's coverage
period."119
109. Id. (citing GuideOne Elite Ins. Co. v. Fielder Rd. Baptist Church, 197 S.W.3d 305,
310 (Tex. 2006)).
110. Id. (citing Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Nokia, Inc., 268 S.W.3d 487, 491 (Tex. 2008)).
111. Id. at 824 (quoting Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 268 S.W.3d at 491).
112. Id. (citing Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Merchs. Fast Motor Lines, Inc., 939 S.W.2d
139, 141 (Tex. 1997)).
113. Id. (citing King v. Dallas Fire Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 185, 187 (Tex. 2002)).
114. Id. (citing Gen. Star Indem. Co. v. Gulf Coast Marine Assocs., Inc., 252 S.W.3d
450, 456 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hallman, 159 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tex. 2005))).
115. Id.
116. See Gehan Homes Ltd. v. Emp'rs Mut. Cas. Co., 146 S.W.3d 833, 846 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 2004, pet. denied).
117. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 357 S.W.3d at 825.
118. Id. ("In effect, the [plaintiffs] alleged that [a plaintiff] was injured sometime before
the petition was filed. Nothing in the pleadings negates the possibility that the injury oc-




Furthermore, the appellate court explained that coverage did not turn
on extrinsic evidence or facts that were "not encompassed within the fac-
tual allegations in the underlying suit." 1 2 0 Rather, a liberal construction
of the "allegations themselves" was enough to state a potentially covered
claim, thereby triggering the duty to defend.121 Accordingly, the appellate
court affirmed the trial court's judgment.122
In a similar case, the Dallas Court of Appeals considered whether a
negligence suit brought against a home builder by the purchaser triggered
a defense obligation where no dates of property damage were alleged.123
In 1999, Vines-Herrin Custom Homes, LLC (Vines-Herrin) built a single-
family home in Plano, Texas.124 Vines-Herrin was covered by a CGL pol-
icy with an initial policy period from November 9, 1998, to November 9,
1999. The policy was renewed the next year for an additional policy pe-
riod, ending on November 9, 2000. At the policy's expiration, Vines-Her-
rin purchased another policy from one of the original insurer's sister
companies, with a policy period from November 9, 2000, to November 9,
2001. The final policy purchased by Vines-Herrin covered the period from
September 18, 2001, to September 18, 2002. Thus, Vines-Herrin had CGL
coverage from November 9, 1998, to September 18, 2002.
In May of 2000, the purchaser bought the home from Vines-Herrin for
$989,353. Within a few days of moving in the purchaser began experienc-
ing problems with the home, including water intrusion and doors not
shutting correctly after a rainstorm. Over the course of the next few
months, the purchaser noticed water collecting on the home's window
sills and damage to the home's sheetrock and baseboards. Cracks also
began developing in the home's ceiling. In late November of 2000, the
purchaser found that a window in the back of the home's master bath-
room had begun to sink into the home's frame. More cracks and leaks
continued to develop in 2001, and the home's ceiling and roof began to
sag in early 2002. Alarmed by these ongoing problems, the purchaser no-
tified Vines-Herrin of the issues with the home; however, no effort was
made to repair the damages. Ultimately, the purchaser filed suit against
Vines-Herrin in January of 2003 for damages resulting from negligent
construction.12 5 After Great American Lloyds Insurance Company
(Great American) denied Vines-Herrin's request for a defense, Vines-
Herrin sought a declaration of coverage on both defense and indem-
120. Id. at 826 (distinguishing Pine Oak Builders, Inc. v. Great Am. Lloyds Ins. Co., 279
S.W.3d 650 (Tex. 2009)).
121. Id. ("The plaintiffs in the underlying suit alleged facts that supported an inference
of coverage and that were 'sufficient to permit proof on a trial' of the truth of the infer-
ence." (quoting Heyeden Newport Chem. Corp. v. So. Gen. Ins. Corp., 387 S.W.2d 22, 26
(Tex. 1965))).
122. Id.
123. Vines-Herrin Custom Homes, LLC v. Great Am. Lloyds Ins. Co., 357 S.W.3d 166,
168-70 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, pet. filed).
124. Id. at 168.
125. Id. at 168-69.
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nity.126 Vines-Herrin also brought claims for breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing, breach of contract, and DTPA and insurance code
violations.127
In May of 2006, Vines-Herrin informed Great American that it no
longer had funding for defense costs and agreed to arbitrate the dispute
with the purchaser. Although the arbitration petition dropped all allega-
tions except negligence, Great American still refused to participate in the
arbitration. The arbitrator ultimately awarded the purchaser
$2,487,507.77 in damages, and the parties executed a settlement agree-
ment assigning all claims, rights, and causes of action against Great
American to the purchaser. The trial court in the coverage action, apply-
ing the "manifestation rule," initially ruled in favor of Great American.128
However, shortly thereafter, the Texas Supreme Court in Don's Building
Supply, Inc. v. OneBeacon Insurance Co. rejected the "manifestation
rule" in favor of the "actual injury" approach.129 Because of this change
in law, the trial court set aside the original judgment and reopened the
case to hear evidence on when the actual damage to the resident oc-
curred.o30 Ultimately, the trial court found that although Vines-Herrin
and the purchaser established that "(1) the [home's construction] was
covered by an uninterrupted period of insurance . . . and (2) that the
damages . . . manifested during [that] uninterrupted period . . . , [they]
failed to show, by expert testimony, the date when actual physical dam-
age to the property occurred."131 Furthermore, the trial court found that
the purchaser's original complaint against Vines-Herrin "failed to allege
the date when actual physical damage to the property occurred."1 32 Ac-
cordingly, the trial court held that Great American had no duty to defend
Vines-Herrin.133 On appeal, Vines-Herrin and the purchaser argued that
the "actual injury" approach does not "require a party to allege [the] ex-
act date [on which the property] damage occurred," nor must the party
present "expert testimony [proving] an actual date of [damage]."1 34
After disposing of Great American's jurisdictional argument, the ap-
pellate court turned to Don's Building, which governed the parties' re-
maining issues.135 In Don's Building, certain homeowners sued a stucco
distributor "alleging [that] the stucco was defective and allowed moisture
to seep into the wall cavities ... ,causing ... wood rot that [went] unno-
126. Id. at 169.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. (citing Don's Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. OneBeacon Ins. Co., 267 S.W.3d 20, 24-25
(Tex. 2008)) ("Under the 'actual injury' approach, property damage 'occurs' when actual






134. Id. at 169-70.
135. Id. at 170-71.
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ticed because" the wall's exterior was not damaged.136 The distributor's
insurer refused to provide a defense and sought a declaration of no cover-
age, arguing that "the damage was not discovered until after the policy
period . .. ended."137 The Texas Supreme Court focused on the policy
language and "adopted the actual-injury rule, holding that property dam-
age occurs during the policy period if 'actual physical damage to the prop-
erty occurred' during the policy period."1 38
Turning to the case sub judice, the appellate court initially noted that
the trial court had found "that '[t]here was an uninterrupted period of
insurance coverage"' during the home's construction and that the pur-
chaser "'suffered a continuing series of injuries and damages throughout
[this] period[ ].' "139 Additionally, after hearing uncontradicted expert tes-
timony, the trial court found that the damages were caused by defective
framing.140 Based on these findings and conclusions, the appellate court
determined that "the trial court interpreted Don's Building to require (1)
an exact date of actual injury and (2) expert testimony establishing [such]
date." 141 However, "Don's Building held only that property damage
under the CGL policy 'occurred when actual physical damage to the
property occurred."' 142
The appellate court next examined the duty to defend, whereby under
the eight-corners rule "only the pleadings and policy language are consid-
ered."143 Here, the appellate court found that the purchaser's petition
potentially stated a claim within the scope of the policies.14 4 The "policies
provided continuous coverage from November 9, 1998 . . . to September
18, 2002."145 Furthermore, the purchaser's petition alleged that the home
was built in 1999 and that by April of 2001, the home was showing signs
of damage. Therefore, applying the eight-corners rule, "the pleadings suf-
ficiently allege[d] the policies were in effect prior to construction and ac-
tual damage occurred sometime during or after construction .... ."146 At a
minimum, then, "the petition[ ] adequately plead that actual physical
damage to the property potentially occurred during the . . . policy pe-
riod[ ]"; accordingly, Great American owed Vines-Herrin a defense
obligation. 147
To summarize, Austin Power and Vines-Herrin demonstrate that Texas
state courts continue to strictly abide by the eight-corners rule-even
136. Id. at 171 (citing Don's Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. OneBeacon Ins. Co., 267 S.W.3d 20,
22 (Tex. 2008)).
137. Id. (citing Don's Bldg. Supply, Inc., 267 S.W.3d at 22).
138. Id. (quoting Don's Bldg. Supply, Inc., 267 S.W.3d at 24).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 172.
142. Id. (quoting Don's Bldg. Supply, Inc., 267 S.W.3d at 24).
143. Id. (citing Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Nat'1 Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pitts-
burgh, PA, 334 S.W.3d 217, 219 (Tex. 2011)).






where no dates of injury or damage are alleged in the pleading-thereby
requiring the insurer to point to specific allegations removing any infer-
ence that the alleged injury or damage occurred during the policy period.
Such a rule may incentivize vague pleadings while also hindering chal-
lenges by insureds to these vague pleadings, as plaintiffs and defendant-
insureds alike will want to trigger the maximum amount of available in-
surance coverage. Thus, it appears that unless and until the Texas Su-
preme Court expressly carves out an exception to the eight-corners rule,
Texas state courts will continue to strictly apply the rule.
C. APPLICATION OF THE EIGHT-CORNERS RULE TO THE
"KNOWN Loss" PROVISION
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had
occasion to rule on the use of extrinsic evidence in determining whether
the "known loss" provision bars coverage. 148 As previously discussed,
Texas courts apply the eight-corners rule in determining whether the duty
to defend exists. 149 When conducting the duty to defend analysis, "it is
inappropriate . .. to consider 'facts ascertained before the suit, developed
in the process of litigation, or by the ultimate outcome of the suit.'"'150
Therefore, "extrinsic evidence such as '[f]acts outside the pleadings, even
those easily ascertained, are not ordinarily material to the [duty to de-
fend] determination' .... 51 Applying these general principles, the Fifth
Circuit in Colony National Insurance Co. v. Unique Industrial Products
Co. held that application of the known loss provision in the duty to de-
fend context is resolved by the eight-corners rule; in other words, courts
generally may not consider extrinsic evidence in analyzing the known loss
provision. 152
Unique Industrial Product Company, L.P.-the insured in Colony Na-
tional-had an agreement with Uponor, Inc. to supply brass fittings and
swivel nuts for plumbing products.153 Uponor then distributed the fin-
ished plumbing products to other companies for installation in home
plumbing systems. These companies, however, began complaining that
the parts supplied by Unique were failing and causing damages at the
residences where the finished plumbing systems were installed. Because
of these failures, Unique was sued in federal district court in both Texas
and Minnesota. In both suits, Uponor alleged that it had purchased the
parts since 2002, but that before or in June of 2004, Uponor notified
Unique of its product failures. Unique thereafter provided different
148. Colony Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Unique Indus. Prod. Co., 487 F. App'x 888, 893-94 (5th
Cir. 2012).
149. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Nokia, Inc., 268 S.W.3d 487, 491 (Tex. 2008).
150. Colony Nat. Ins. Co., 487 F. App'x at 891 (quoting Primrose Operating Co. v. Nat'l
Am. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 546, 552 (5th Cir. 2004)).
151. Id. at 891-92 (quoting Weingarten Realty Mgmt. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
343 S.W.3d 859, 862 (Tex. App-Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied)).
152. Id. at 892.
153. Id. at 889.
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swivel nuts to Uponor; however, Unique allegedly did not monitor these
new parts for defects.
Uponor's problems did not stop with the swivel nuts, as it began receiv-
ing complaints of brass fittings failing in the home plumbing systems with
subsequent water damages to the homes. Uponor decided to remove the
defective products from the inventories of its customers and returned
these products to Unique. After representatives from Uponor and
Unique met to discuss the product defects, Unique allegedly "agreed to
take responsibility for existing and future claims" if Uponor purchased
the remaining inventory. 154 According to Uponor, Unique never followed
through with the agreement, despite the fact that Unique had knowledge
of the problems and never notified Uponor or made necessary modifica-
tions to its products. Ultimately, Unique requested defense and coverage
for the suits from its general liability insurer, Colony National Insurance
Company (Colony).' 55 Colony, however, declined Unique's request and
instead sought a declaratory judgment in federal court. In granting Col-
ony's motion for summary judgment, the district court judge considered
the affidavit of an underwriter for Colony along with the policy applica-
tion.156 Based on this extrinsic evidence, the district judge concluded that
Unique had knowledge of the alleged losses prior to the inception of the
policy.' 57 Therefore, the policy's known loss provision within the insuring
agreement applied to bar coverage for Unique. Aggrieved, Unique ap-
pealed to the Fifth Circuit.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit noted that "[s]ome Texas intermediate ap-
pellate courts . . . have carved out a narrow exception [to the eight-cor-
ners rule, which allows] the use of extrinsic evidence [where it] is
'relevant to an independent and discrete coverage issue, not touching on
the merits of the underlying third-party claim."" 58 Specifically, some
Texas courts (along with the Fifth Circuit) have previously held "that ex-
trinsic evidence may be used 'when it is initially impossible to discern
whether coverage is potentially implicated and when the extrinsic evi-
dence goes solely to a fundamental issue of coverage which does not
overlap with the merits of or engage the truth or falsity of any facts al-
leged in the underlying cases.' "159 However, the Fifth Circuit also noted
that while "the Texas Supreme Court has never recognized ... any excep-
tion to the eight-corners rule, it has acknowledged that . . . 'such [an]
exception would not extend to evidence . . . relevant to both insurance
154. Id.
155. Id. at 890.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 892 (quoting GuideOne Elite Ins. Co. v. Fielder Rd. Baptist Church, 197
S.W.3d 305, 308-09 (Tex. 2006)).
159. Id. (quoting Northfield Ins. Co. v. Loving Home Care, Inc., 363 F.3d 523, 531 (5th
Cir. 2004)); see also Gonzales v. Am. States Ins. Co. of Tex., 628 S.W.2d 184, 186 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ).
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coverage and the factual merits of the [underlying lawsuit]."160
Applying the foregoing analysis, the Fifth Circuit held that the district
court improperly considered extrinsic evidence-the underwriter's affida-
vit and the policy application-in determining that the known loss provi-
sion applied. 161 The Fifth Circuit began by noting that the factual
allegations in the underlying complaint must be liberally construed in
performing the duty to defend analysis, with all doubts resolved in favor
of the insured. 162 Here, the underlying lawsuits were based on allegations
that plumbing fixtures manufactured by the insured failed, thereby caus-
ing damages to residences.163 Part of Uponor's case required proof that
Unique had knowledge of the defects in its swivel nuts prior to selling
them to Uponor in 2004 (prior to the inception of the first policy) and
that Unique had agreed to supply different swivel nuts.164 The Fifth Cir-
cuit found, however, that Uponor did not allege that Unique had knowl-
edge of the defects in these different swivel nuts prior to the first policy's
inception; therefore, the allegations did "not clearly and unambiguously
fall outside the scope of coverage of the CGL policies and a potentially
covered claim clearly exist[ed]."1 65 Because the claim fell within the gen-
eral coverage of the policies thereby triggering the duty to defend, the
Fifth Circuit next turned to whether an exclusionary basis existed.166
Here, the Fifth Circuit examined the district court's use of extrinsic evi-
dence in applying the known loss provision, whereby the district court
found that Unique had knowledge of the losses prior to purchasing the
policies because Unique admitted in its "application that it had 'sold a
batch of T-fittings from one manufacturer which was defective. "1 6 7
Under Texas law, the fortuity doctrine prohibits an insured from seeking
coverage for losses that have already begun and are or should be known
to have begun.168 Nevertheless, according to the Fifth Circuit, "applica-
tion of the fortuity doctrine in [making] the duty-to-defend [determina-
tion] is resolved by the eight-corners rule."169 Moreover, because the
extrinsic evidence used by the district court "overlapp[ed] with the merits
of or engage[d] the truth or falsity of [the] facts alleged in the underlying
[lawsuits]," the narrow exception to the eight-corners rule did not ap-
160. Colony Nat. Ins. Co., 487 F. App'x at 892 (quoting Pine Oak Builders, Inc. v. Great
Am. Lloyds Ins. Co., 279 S.W.3d 650, 654 (Tex. 2009) (citing GuideOne, 197 S.W.3d at
308-09)).
161. Id. at 893.
162. Id. at 892 (citing Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Nokia, Inc., 268 S.W.3d 487, 491 (Tex.
2008)).
163. Id. at 889.
164. Id. at 892-93.
165. Id. at 893.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. (citing Two Pesos, Inc. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 901 S.W.2d 495, 501 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1995, pet. denied)).
169. Id. (citing Warrantech Corp. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 210 S.W.3d 760, 766 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied)).
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ply.170 Specifically, the Fifth Circuit found that the insured's "knowledge
of problems with its products and the timing of that knowledge [was] rel-
evant to its liability" in the underlying lawsuit; accordingly, it was "not
wholly outside the issues in the underlying liability case." 17  In other
words, considering the extrinsic evidence required accepting as proven
facts that Unique manufactured defective products and had knowledge of
those defects-however, such a finding "would be highly prejudicial to
Unique[] . . ." in the underlying lawsuits. 172 Given the foregoing, the
Fifth Circuit held that the district court improperly considered extrinsic
evidence in applying the known loss provision. 1 7 3
Since 1982, when a Texas court first recognized a narrow exception to
the eight-corners rule,'17 4 Texas courts have struggled with crafting the
proper scope of such an exception. Accordingly, application of the excep-
tion has been inconsistent.' 75 Adding to this confusion was a 2004 ruling
whereby the Fifth Circuit made an Erie guess that the "Texas Supreme
Court would not recognize any exception to the strict eight corners
rule."176 However, the Fifth Circuit also predicted that if the Texas Su-
preme Court were to recognize any such exception, it "would only apply
in very limited circumstances . ".. . 177 The Texas Supreme Court subse-
quently opined on the scope of the exception-albeit in a narrow fashion
and without express recognition-in 2006178 and later in 2009; thus, the
supreme court left open the possibility that a narrow exception could in
fact apply.' 7 9
Furthermore, application of the eight-corners rule in cases such as
Unique Products may allow insureds to circumvent the known loss provi-
sion and fortuity doctrine, which provides that "an insured cannot seek
insurance coverage for a loss that has already begun and which is or
should be known to have begun."' 80 In other words, by applying the





174. Gonzales v. Am. States Ins. Co. of Tex., 628 S.W.2d 184, 186 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1982, no writ) (citing Fort Worth Lloyds v. Garza, 527 S.W.2d 195, 196 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
175. See, e.g., Chapman v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 171 S.W.3d 222,
230 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.); Utica Lloyd's of Tex. v. Sitech Eng'g
Corp., 38 S.W.3d 260, 263 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.); State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co. v. Wade, 827 S.W.2d 448, 452 (Tex. App--Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied).
176. Northfield Ins. Co. v. Loving Home Care, Inc., 363 F.3d 523, 531 (5th Cir. 2004).
177. Id.
178. GuideOne Elite Ins. Co. v. Fielder Rd. Baptist Church, 197 S.W.3d 305, 309 (Tex.
2006) (citing Northfield Ins. Co., 363 F.3d at 531).
179. Pine Oak Builders, Inc. v. Great Am. Lloyds Ins. Co., 279 S.W.3d 650, 654 (Tex.
2009).
180. Colony Nat'l. Ins. Co. v. Unique Indus. Prod. Co., 487 F. App'x 888, 893 (5th Cir.
2012) (citing Two Pesos, Inc. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 901 S.W.2d 495, 501 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1995, pet. denied)).
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a substantial benefit of a defense under a policy procured in violation of
the known loss provision and fortuity doctrine.
VI. INSURER'S RIGHT OF REIMBURSEMENT
In prior articles, we discussed the Texas Supreme Court's decision in
Mid-Continent Insurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.181 and its
continuing impact on insurers' rights of contribution and subrogation
under Texas law. Since the opinion was issued in 2007, some appellate
courts have limited the decision to its facts while others have interpreted
the decision broadly.
In Mid-Continent, the Texas Supreme Court held that any "direct claim
for contribution between co-insurers disappears when the insurance poli-
cies contain 'other insurance' or 'pro rata' clauses." 182 Additionally, the
supreme court held that because the right of subrogation is based on a
situation where the insurer "stands in the shoes" of its insured, if the in-
sured is fully indemnified it will have no right to pass to the insurer for
the insurer to enforce. 83 These holdings created confusion among both
insureds and their insurers regarding the intended scope of the holdings
and the relative obligations among co-insurers. Specifically, worries cen-
tered around whether restricting a co-insurer from seeking reimburse-
ment or contribution from another co-insurer for payments made on a
mutual insured's behalf would stifle settlement negotiations. This situa-
tion would leave a contributing co-insurer seeking to accept a settlement
demand on the mutual insured's behalf with two equally displeasing op-
tions: (1) pay more than its proportionate share of liability for the mutual
insured's loss, or (2) decline a reasonable settlement demand and proceed
with the risk of an excessive verdict at trial.
In 2010, the Fifth Circuit dispelled some of these concerns by holding
that the Texas Supreme Court in Mid-Continent addressed only whether a
co-insurer may seek reimbursement under its "other insurance" clause
through contribution or subrogation from a nonpaying co-insurer for
amounts paid to indemnify their common insured. 18 4 Here, the Fifth Cir-
cuit specifically noted that "Mid-Continent left open the separate ques-
tion of whether a co-insurer that pays more than its share of defense costs
may recover such costs from a co-insurer who violates its duty to defend a
common insured."1 85 Rather, it is a long-standing principle of Texas in-
surance law that although an insurer may owe only a portion of the costs
associated with the defense of its insured, the insurer nevertheless has a
complete duty to defend that is "'equally and concurrently due by all' . . .
insurers."186
181. Mid-Continent Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 236 S.W.3d 765 (Tex. 2007).
182. Id. at 772.
183. Id. at 774-75.
184. Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Emp'rs Mut. Cas. Co., 592 F.3d 687, 694 (5th Cir.
2010).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 695 (quoting Mid-Continent Ins. Co., 236 S.W.3d at 772).
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Shortly after the Fifth Circuit issued its opinion in Trinity, the Austin
Court of Appeals criticized the Fifth Circuit's analysis, holding that the
Fifth Circuit misinterpreted the meaning of Mid-Continent.187 In rejecting
the argument that Mid-Continent does not bar a contribution claim by a
co-insurer against another co-insurer that breaches the duty to defend,
the court of appeals noted that "the supreme court's holding was that, in
the absence of a contractual agreement between the insurers to be obli-
gated for the proportional amount, the presence of 'other insurance'
clauses in the polices precludes an equitable contribution claim."188 Here,
the court of appeals disagreed that the Texas Supreme Court had left
unresolved the question of whether a co-insurer may recover when it pays
more than its proportionate share of defense costs, finding instead that
the contribution claim for defense costs was barred as a matter of law. 1 8 9
During the Survey period, the Houston Fourteenth District Court of
Appeals examined Mid-Continent as applied to contractual subroga-
tion.190 Here, the court of appeals held that Mid-Continent does not pro-
hibit a co-insurer from bringing a subrogation claim against another co-
insurer where the insured was not fully indemnified because the later co-
insurer did not contribute to amounts owed in the insured's settlement.191
The court of appeals reasoned that "the facts of the two cases differ[ed]
significantly" in that a jury had found that none of the subrogees in
Coastal had voluntarily paid to settle the underlying claim, and the co-
insurer against whom subrogation was sought had not discharged any of
its obligations to the insured. 192 Furthermore, the court of appeals found
that while the pro rata "other insurance" clauses in Mid-Continent were
compatible and limited the co-insurer's indemnity obligations, those at
issue in Coastal were mutually repugnant and did not limit the co-in-
surer's indemnity obligations.193 Because the facts of Coastal were signifi-
cantly different from those in Mid-Continent, the court of appeals held
that Mid-Continent did not apply.194
Also during the Survey period, the Fifth Circuit had occasion to apply
Mid-Continent, holding that an excess insurer may recover defense costs
from primary insurers who wrongfully refuse to provide a defense, even
where the insured transferred its rights against the primary insurers.195
Here, Valero Refining Company had contracted with Encompass Power
Services for the designing, engineering, and construction of a co-genera-
187. See Truck Ins. Exch. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 320 S.W.3d 613, 622-23 (Tex.
App.-Austin 2010, no pet.).
188. Id. at 622 (citing Mid-Continent Ins. Co., 236 S.W.3d at 773).
189. Id. at 622-23.
190. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Coastal Ref. & Mktg., Inc., 369 S.W.3d 559 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.).
191. Id. at 566.
192. Id.
193. Id. 569.
194. Id. at 566.
195. Cont'1 Cas. Co. v. N. Am. Capacity Ins. Co., 683 F.3d 79, 85-88 (5th Cir. 2012).
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tion facility in California. 196 After a fire caused significant damages to the
facility, Valero brought suit against Encompass seeking more than $40
million in damages. During the litigation, the excess carrier assumed En-
compass's full defense after the only primary carrier had agreed to defend
Encompass settled with Valero-to which Encompass had assigned all of
its rights against its insurers as part of its bankruptcy. One of the two
remaining primary insurers also settled with Valero, and the excess in-
surer then sought subrogation from the primary insurers, citing a provi-
sion of its policy whereby the insured assigned all of its rights to recover
payments made by the excess carrier under its policy.
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the primary insurers argued that be-
cause contractual subrogation requires that the subrogee "stand in the
shoes" of the insured, and Encompass had "empty shoes" as it had as-
signed all of its rights to Valero, the excess insurer's claim for subrogation
was improper. 197 In other words, the primary insurers argued that be-
cause their insured no longer had any rights of recovery against them, the
excess insurer stood in empty shoes and also could not recover. The Fifth
Circuit, however, disagreed, holding that refusing to allow the excess in-
surer "to recover from the primary carriers when those carriers had an
obligation to protect the insured would encourage the primary carriers to
breach their duties to defend rather than place their insured's interests
above their own by defending and seeking reimbursement later."198 Fur-
thermore, the Fifth Circuit held that the assignment of Encompass's
rights in bankruptcy did not "empty" the insured's shoes because the
"right to demand a defense from the insurers who owed that defense
could not flow to its adversary in the very action that it was actively
contesting."' 99
Lastly, the Fifth Circuit held that the Mid-Continent bar is not applica-
ble to consecutive insurers because, unlike the insurers in Mid-Continent,
the insurers here were not co-primary as the policies at issue were consec-
utive, not concurrent. 200 However, Fifth Circuit's discussion of the scope
of Mid-Continent was dicta, as the court had already resolved the dispute
based on the parties' other issues. Still, the Fifth Circuit explained that
despite the fact that the "other insurance" clauses at issue were identical
to those in Mid-Continent, the policies provided coverage only for "bodily
injury" or "property damage" occurring "during the policy period."201
Consequently, because the policies did not cover the same policy period,
"by necessity the policies do not cover the same injury or damage and
196. Id. at 82.
197. Id. at 85.
198. Id. at 87 (citing Amerisure Ins. Co. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 611 F.3d 299, 308 (5th
Cir. 2010); Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 444 S.W.2d 583, 589
(Tex. 1969)).
199. Id. at 88.
200. See Great Am. Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Audubon Ins. Co., 377 S.W.3d 802, 810-812 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2012), opinion withdrawn and superceded, No. 05-11-00021-CV, 2013 WL
85240 (Tex. App.-Dallas Jan. 8, 2013, no pet.).
201. Id. at 811.
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there is no 'other valid and collective insurance [that] is available to the
insured for a loss we cover."' 202
To summarize, based on the opinions issued since Mid-Continent, it ap-
pears that federal and state courts are split with regard to the proper
scope of Mid-Continent as applied to contribution and subrogation claims
by co-insurers. Federal courts have seemingly attempted to limit the hold-
ing in Mid-Continent to its particular facts, one state court has given the
decision a broader application, and at least two state courts have limited
Mid-Continent to its facts. During the Survey period, the Fifth Circuit
rejected the empty shoes argument whereby the insured has assigned all
of its rights under the policy, while the Dallas Court of Appeals held that
Mid-Continent does not apply to consecutive insurers. Therefore, while
the trend in federal courts is to apply the case in a limited fashion, appli-
cation in Texas intermediate appellate courts seems less clear. More spe-
cifically, Texas state courts have yet to apply Mid-Continent to a factual
scenario where the insured was fully indemnified for a mutually covered
loss. Unless and until the Texas Supreme Court specifies the contours of
its holding in Mid-Continent, we anticipate that courts will continue to
struggle with the proper scope of the opinion.
VII. CONCLUSION
During this Survey period, Texas courts continued to examine impor-
tant issues arising under various insurance policies affecting both policy-
holders and insurers. Significantly, the Texas Supreme Court overruled
two landmark decisions from the 1980s giving injured workers broad pro-
tections, thereby eviscerating nearly all extracontractual remedies in
workers' compensation cases. Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit certified two
important questions regarding the proper application of the contractual
liability exclusion. Guidance from the Texas Supreme Court on these is-
sues will undoubtedly have a profound effect on construction profession-
als and their insurers alike.
Additionally, with respect to the duty to defend, decisions during this
Survey period indicate that unless and until the Texas Supreme Court
articulates specific exceptions to the eight-corners rule, lower Texas state
courts and the Fifth Circuit will be reluctant to deviate from the rule.
With regard to an insured's right to select its own counsel, the Fifth Cir-
cuit seemingly dispelled the concern that the mere issuance of a reserva-
tion of rights letter creates a conflict allowing the insured to control its
own defense at the insurer's cost.
Lastly, this Survey period saw continued inconsistencies among the
state and federal courts applying Mid-Continent; nevertheless, it appears
that the trend is to limit its applications to its specific facts. We anticipate
that the Texas Supreme Court will need to revisit the issues addressed
202. Id. (quoting Mid-Continent Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 236 S.W.3d 765, 769
(Tex. 2007)).
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therein to provide guidance on the intended scope of its opinion and re-
solve litigated and unlitigated issues left unanswered over the past five
years.
